Will BYND's FY2025 10-K include going concern language from the auditor?

ASC 205-40 requires evaluating substantial doubt within 12 months of the balance sheet date (Dec 31, 2025 to Dec 31, 2026). With ~$200-240M post-restructuring cash and ~$130-160M annual burn, the 12-month cash math technically works. However, the standard also requires evaluating management's plans and whether they are probable of being effective. The material weakness in ICFR, accelerating cash burn ($98.1M in 9 months vs $98.8M for all FY2024), no breakeven scenario, and dependence on equity markets at distressed pricing all weigh toward going concern. Yet Deloitte gave an unqualified FY2024 opinion when the situation was arguably worse pre-restructuring. The restructuring improved the balance sheet by converting $1.15B debt to $209.7M in notes plus equity. This creates a genuinely difficult call for the auditor.

Focusing on the specific ASC 205-40 mechanics: the 12-month look-forward from Dec 31, 2025 goes to Dec 31, 2026. With ~$200-240M post-restructuring cash and ~$130-160M burn, the company can survive 12 months under base case assumptions. The October 2025 debt restructuring was specifically designed to address the maturity wall and extend runway — Deloitte may view this as a mitigating management plan. The auditor gave an unqualified opinion for FY2024 when BYND had $1.15B in debt obligations; the restructuring reduced this to $239M total. Adding going concern language now, after the balance sheet improved, would require explaining why the improved situation warrants more concern. However, the material weakness and absence of a breakeven path remain serious negatives.

The auditor's incentive structure and recent regulatory environment weigh toward inclusion. Post-SVB, auditors have been more conservative about going concern assessments. Deloitte faces significant liability risk if BYND fails within 12-24 months without a going concern warning. The material weakness disclosed November 2025 creates a paper trail suggesting unreliable internal controls — this directly undermines the credibility of management's representations about future plans. The Q3 10-Q filing delay signals operational dysfunction. Even if the narrow 12-month cash math works, the combination of no breakeven path, material weakness, accelerating burn ($98.1M in 9 months matching full FY2024's $98.8M), serial revenue declines, and the Black Swan Beacon's 25-40% probability estimate all point toward going concern language. The Stress Scanner's CRITICAL assessment appears more rigorous than Roadkill Radar's STRAINED per the meta-synthesis.

The math tilts toward going concern inclusion. ~$200-240M cash against ~$130-160M annual burn means the company barely survives 12 months under a stress scenario. The material weakness in ICFR, Q3 filing delay, and zero breakeven path give Deloitte strong basis for concern language. The restructuring bought time but did not fix the underlying business — revenue is declining every quarter and gross margins collapsed from 12.8% to ~6.9%. Deloitte's liability risk from omitting going concern language far exceeds the reputational cost of including it. The committee finding that 'no plausible scenario achieves operating cash flow breakeven' is the critical factor — the auditor must evaluate whether management has a credible plan, and the analysis shows no such plan exists.

Going concern under ASC 205-40 centers on the 12-month window. BYND restructured specifically to extend runway, converting $1.15B in obligations to $239M total debt plus equity dilution. With $200-240M cash vs $130-160M burn, the base case shows survival through the 12-month window. Deloitte may take the view that the restructuring WAS the management plan to address liquidity, and it succeeded in extending runway. The auditor gave a clean opinion in FY2024 when the debt structure was far worse. Including going concern language for FY2025 after the company materially improved its balance sheet would require strong justification. The material weakness and filing delay are concerning new factors but may not be sufficient alone to trigger going concern when the cash position improved.

The combination of negative factors is unusually dense: material weakness in ICFR, delayed Q3 10-Q filing, accelerating cash burn, no breakeven scenario in any analyst case, revenue declining every quarter with Q4 guided at -20% YoY, and gross margin collapse. Deloitte must evaluate not just the 12-month cash arithmetic but whether management's plans are 'probable of being effectively implemented.' The committee found that breakeven requires either revenue doubling or gross margin quadrupling — neither is remotely plausible. Management cannot credibly represent a path to sustainability. The 17-20 month runway means the company needs additional capital by mid-2027, and at current share price levels equity issuance is deeply dilutive. The market is pricing this as a distressed situation already.

Material weakness + filing delay + accelerating cash burn + no breakeven scenario = strong going concern indicators. The restructuring extended runway but did not address the fundamental business deterioration. Revenue declining every quarter with negative Q1 gross margins. Auditor has ample basis for including going concern language. Slightly above coin-flip because the 12-month cash math is borderline rather than clearly breached.

The 12-month cash math barely works post-restructuring ($200-240M vs $130-160M burn). Balance sheet is actually improved from FY2024 when Deloitte gave a clean opinion — total debt went from $1.15B to $239M. The restructuring IS the management plan per ASC 205-40. But material weakness is a new negative factor that did not exist in FY2024. True coin flip between the improved balance sheet (arguing against concern) and the new negative signals plus no breakeven path (arguing for concern).

Pattern recognition: companies with material weaknesses, filing delays, declining revenue every quarter, and burn rates consuming >50% of cash annually frequently receive going concern opinions. The restructuring only delays the inevitable — the business cannot self-sustain. The Black Swan Beacon's 25-40% estimate may understate the risk given the accumulation of negative factors since that assessment. Auditors in the post-SVB environment err on the side of caution.