Will PCT disclose specific unit economics data (cost-per-pound or contribution margin) by Q2 2026?

Management has an established pattern of providing aspirational language without quantitative data. When directly asked by an analyst about key assumptions behind sub-virgin costs, the CEO gave a qualitative response. The committee assessed this as E0 evidence — the lowest level. Companies that withhold unit economics typically do so because the data is unfavorable. By June 30, 2026, the next opportunity is the Q1 2026 earnings call (~May). Given the pattern, voluntary disclosure is unlikely unless forced by analyst pressure or the data improves dramatically post-turnaround.

The post-turnaround period could change the calculus. If Ironton throughput improves meaningfully, management may want to showcase the improvement with specific metrics. The new CFO (Carpenter) may bring a different disclosure philosophy. Also, if the company is seeking Augusta financing, project finance investors would require unit economics data — which could flow into public disclosures. However, these are speculative improvements against a demonstrated pattern of withholding. I weight the demonstrated pattern more heavily.

The resolution criteria specifically requires numerical data — qualitative statements about 'sub-virgin cash costs' do not qualify. This is a high bar given management's demonstrated preference for qualitative language. The Q1 2026 earnings call is likely the only opportunity before the June 30 deadline. Companies with unfavorable unit economics in capital-intensive industries have strong incentive to delay disclosure as long as possible. I'm at higher confidence on a low probability estimate.

Management has consistently avoided quantitative unit economics disclosure across multiple earnings calls. The pattern is clear and deliberate. However, two factors could change this: (1) Post-turnaround Ironton data may be positive enough to share, and (2) investor/analyst pressure may increase as the company approaches financing needs. The Q1 earnings call will be the key moment. Probability is low but not negligible given potential catalysts.

The resolution window is narrow — essentially one earnings call. Even if post-turnaround data is positive, management may want additional quarters of data before disclosing to ensure the improvement is sustainable. The new CFO transition adds uncertainty about disclosure timing. Pre-revenue and early-revenue companies in capital-intensive sectors typically don't disclose unit economics until they're confident the data tells a good story. Low probability.

I assign slightly higher probability because the question includes investor presentations as qualifying events, not just earnings calls and SEC filings. The company could host an investor day or participate in a conference where they share more operational data. The Augusta financing process might also generate public disclosures through prospectus-type documents. But the base case remains that management avoids disclosure. ~25% accounts for the multiple possible disclosure channels.

Management has been asked directly and declined to provide numbers. Pattern is clear. One earnings call in the window. Low probability of voluntary disclosure. New CFO unlikely to change approach immediately.

Data withholding pattern is strong. Post-turnaround improvement could change incentive but timeframe is tight. Even if turnaround succeeds, management may delay disclosure. Low probability.

The specific numerical requirement is demanding given management's qualitative-only track record. One earnings call window. Companies disclose favorable data and withhold unfavorable data. Low probability without dramatic turnaround success.