Will Berkshire Hathaway resume share buybacks (>$1B in any quarter) by Q3 2026?

The committee's weighted explanation of the buyback pause -- 50% valuation, 30% opportunity preservation, 20% excise tax -- implies multiple barriers must simultaneously clear for resumption. At ~$520-540 BRK.B, the operating businesses trade at ~9x earnings ex-cash, which management evidently does not consider cheap enough. Abel's stated 'identical philosophy' and capital allocation hierarchy (buybacks last after internal opportunities, acquisitions, public equity) means the bar remains high. The resolution window covers Q1-Q3 2026, giving three quarterly opportunities, but no catalyst for a 15-20% price decline is apparent. The 1% excise tax is a persistent structural drag that increases the hurdle rate. PacifiCorp wildfire exposure further argues for cash preservation. Zero insider purchases alongside Jain's $8M sale at near-ATH reinforces that insiders do not view shares as undervalued.

There are three quarterly windows (Q1-Q3 2026) for a >$1B buyback quarter, which provides meaningful optionality. A market correction of 15-20% -- not historically unusual over a 9-month window -- could bring BRK.B into a valuation range where Abel acts. Berkshire's FY2025 annual report (late Feb 2026) will reveal Q4 2025 buyback activity, which this market's resolution window captures indirectly if Q4 2025 numbers show a restart pattern. However, the committee found that even if valuation is the primary factor (~50%), the excise tax (~20%) and opportunity preservation (~30%) create additional friction. Abel's capital deployment hierarchy explicitly places buybacks last. The staleness note (fundamentals 137 days old) introduces genuine uncertainty -- Q4 2025 results could shift the picture materially -- but the base case from available data is continued pause.

The most underappreciated factor is the excise tax trajectory. Buffett explicitly cited concern about political escalation of the 1% rate, calling buybacks 'a better deal for you [individual investors] than for us.' This structural disincentive persists regardless of CEO identity and may actually strengthen under Abel, who lacks Buffett's political capital to advocate against such taxes. The committee's finding that zero buybacks is 'consistent with historical Berkshire discipline' (Stress Scanner: CAPITAL_DEPLOYMENT = DISCIPLINED) suggests the pause is a feature, not a bug, of the management philosophy. With $381.6B in cash generating meaningful T-bill income (~$18-19B annualized at 5%), the opportunity cost of deploying cash for buybacks when shares aren't clearly cheap is tangible. The $1B threshold is substantial -- roughly 0.13% of market cap -- meaning any buyback would need to be a meaningful capital allocation decision, not a token gesture.

The analysis facts paint a clear picture: zero buybacks in 2025 despite record cash, zero insider buying, and Abel committing to 'identical philosophy.' The 50/30/20 split across valuation/opportunity/excise tax means at least two of three factors would need to shift for buybacks to resume at scale. Shares would need to fall meaningfully -- the committee estimates 15-20%+ -- for the valuation component alone. The excise tax is structural and unlikely to decrease. Opportunity preservation argues for continued patience. The only realistic path to YES is a sharp market correction bringing BRK.B below ~$440-460, which is possible but not the base case over the next three quarters.

I weight the data staleness more heavily than other runs. The fundamentals are 137 days old. Q4 2025 and Q1 2026 results will reveal two full quarters of Abel's independent capital allocation decisions. While his rhetoric is 'identical philosophy,' the reality of managing $381.6B in cash as a new CEO with different temperament could produce different outcomes. Buffett was uniquely patient; Abel may face board or shareholder pressure to deploy capital, especially as NARRATIVE_REALITY_GAP is DIVERGING according to Myth Meter -- the cash inaction narrative could push management toward action. The cross-lens conflict between 'disciplined' (Stress Scanner) and 'narrative diverging' (Myth Meter) suggests genuine uncertainty about whether discipline or narrative pressure wins. LOW confidence because the stale data makes this more uncertain than the facts alone suggest.

High confidence in a below-base-rate estimate. The committee's analysis is internally consistent: Abel's capital allocation hierarchy places buybacks explicitly last, the valuation is not compelling at current prices (~9x earnings ex-cash is reasonable but not cheap for a conglomerate), and the excise tax adds friction. The precedent of zero buybacks throughout all of 2025 -- when shares traded at lower prices earlier in the year -- demonstrates that the buyback bar is genuinely high. For a $1B+ quarter to occur by Q3 2026, you need either a substantial price decline OR a philosophical break from 'identical philosophy.' Neither is the base case. PacifiCorp wildfire exposure adds a further reason to preserve cash. The combined weight of evidence points clearly toward continued buyback pause.

Zero buybacks in 2025 with $381.6B cash is a strong negative signal. Abel committed to identical philosophy. 1% excise tax adds friction. Multiple barriers must clear simultaneously. Three quarterly windows provide some optionality but the base case is continued pause. Price would need to fall 15-20%+ per committee assessment.

The strongest signal is the complete cessation throughout 2025 at prices lower than current levels. If Buffett wouldn't buy at $480-500, Abel saying 'identical philosophy' won't buy at $520-540. The excise tax is persistent. Cash earns ~5% in T-bills with no risk. Buyback resumption requires a scenario that simply isn't the base case.

Slightly higher than other haiku runs due to the three-quarter optionality window. A 15-20% market correction is not rare over 9 months -- rough historical probability of a 15%+ drawdown in any given 9-month window is ~15-20%. If it happens, Abel has the cash and the precedent (2018-2023 program) to act quickly. But the base case without a correction is clearly no buybacks.