Will Congress pass new tariff legislation with rates above 15% on broad imports before Section 122 expires in July 2026?

The legislative process is inherently slow. Even with urgency from the 150-day clock, passing broad tariff legislation through both chambers requires committee markup, floor votes, and reconciliation. Historical precedent shows major trade legislation (Smoot-Hawley, Trade Act of 1974) took months to years. The 5-month window is extremely tight for legislation of this scope. However, the administration has strong motivation since Section 122 expires, and reconciliation could theoretically be used. Bipartisan protectionist sentiment helps but partisan divisions on specifics (which countries, which goods, exemptions) would slow progress. The >50% import category breadth requirement is the hardest bar to clear.

The resolution criteria are very specific: rates ABOVE 15% on BROAD imports covering >50% of categories by value. Congress could pass narrow trade legislation that fails the breadth threshold. The administration has alternative executive authorities (Section 301, Section 232) that don't require legislation. The Supreme Court struck down IEEPA specifically, not all executive trade authority. The administration escalated from 10% to 15% within ONE DAY of the SCOTUS ruling, demonstrating a preference for executive speed over legislative process. Congress is more likely to pass framework legislation granting new executive authority than to set specific rates above 15% in statute.

The SCOTUS 6-3 ruling creates a genuine constitutional limit on executive overreach, but the legislative path faces structural obstacles. Farm state Republicans and retail-heavy districts resist broad tariffs. The 50%+ import category threshold is exceptionally demanding — it would be the most sweeping trade law change in decades. The more likely outcomes are narrow legislation targeting specific countries/sectors, or a new executive authority grant that technically isn't 'tariff rates above 15% on broad imports' as specified in the resolution criteria. The committee's finding that the administration prefers maximizing existing executive authority reinforces the low legislative probability.

Five months is insufficient for Congress to pass sweeping trade legislation. Congress has barely managed to pass annual budgets in that timeframe. Broad tariff legislation above 15% on 50%+ of imports would be the most significant trade law change in decades. The committee found that the administration prefers maximizing existing executive authority — Section 301, Section 232, and ITC safeguard actions don't require Congressional action. The incentive to pursue legislation is lower than it appears because executive alternatives exist despite the IEEPA ruling.

The urgency argument has some merit — if the administration makes this a top legislative priority and uses reconciliation, passage is theoretically possible. But reconciliation has Byrd Rule constraints that may limit tariff provisions, and the administration has demonstrated a clear preference for executive tools by escalating Section 122 from 10% to 15% within one day. The committee's finding that Section 122 has a statutory 150-day limit creates a forcing function, but that forcing function is more likely to push toward finding OTHER executive tools rather than waiting for Congress. The political calculus favors speed over the legislative route.

Political reality check: even if bipartisan protectionist sentiment exists, the specific >15% rate on >50% of imports is extreme. This would exceed Smoot-Hawley in breadth. Consumer price impacts would be massive and politically visible. Moderate members from both parties would resist, and business lobbying against this would be intense. The committee's Black Swan Beacon assigned only 15-25% probability to tariffs escalating to 20-25% permanent rates — and that was the probability of the outcome itself, not the probability of the legislative pathway specifically. Legislation is one pathway among several to that outcome, making the legislative probability even lower.

Congress is slow. Five months is short for major legislation. The >50% breadth requirement is the hardest bar to clear. Executive alternatives exist via Section 301 and Section 232. The committee confirmed the administration prefers maximizing executive authority rather than seeking legislation. Low probability but not negligible given bipartisan protectionist sentiment.

Administration moved from 10% to 15% in one day using executive authority. This pattern suggests preference for executive tools over waiting for Congress. SCOTUS struck down IEEPA but other executive trade authorities remain. The committee found tariff risk is 'transformed, not reduced' — but transformation may come through executive channels, not legislation. Congressional path unlikely in the compressed timeframe.

Bipartisan protectionist sentiment is real but translating that into specific >15% legislation on 50%+ of imports in five months is extremely unlikely. Too many competing interests across agricultural, manufacturing, and retail sectors. The committee noted Congressional trade policy is 'highly uncertain' — uncertainty cuts both ways but the base rate for sweeping trade legislation in a 5-month window is very low.