Will CrowdStrike's gross dollar retention rate fall below 95% in any disclosed metric during FY2027?

The resolution mechanics strongly favor NO: non-disclosure defaults to NO, and CrowdStrike has already stopped disclosing GDR. Even if GDR has deteriorated, management can simply continue not reporting it — which resolves NO. Substantively, 97% GDR held through the worst IT outage in history, demonstrating structural lock-in validated at E3 evidence. Module adoption at 49% 6+ modules creates compounding switching costs that make GDR declines below 95% very unlikely even under governance stress. However, the GDR cessation is genuinely concerning — it coincides with the DOJ investigation period, and the committee flagged this as a SIGNIFICANT_GAP. If GDR has deteriorated to 94-95%, management might be forced to disclose it in response to analyst pressure or in a 10-K risk factor update. The 15-20% government revenue exposure creates a plausible channel for deterioration if procurement suspensions materialize.

The key question is whether governance stress from the DOJ/SEC investigation creates a fundamentally different retention dynamic than the operational stress tested by the outage. The committee explicitly noted these are 'distinct moat dimensions with different fragility profiles.' Government customers may invoke exit clauses based on governance concerns — these are contractual, not behavioral, exits. At an estimated 15-20% government revenue share, even a 10-15% government churn rate would reduce overall GDR by 1.5-3pp (from 97% to 94-95.5%), potentially crossing the 95% threshold. However, this worst case requires: (1) the investigation escalating to enforcement, (2) government customers actually exercising exits, and (3) CrowdStrike choosing to disclose the deteriorated metric. All three conditions must hold for YES. The non-disclosure default to NO is the most important factor — CrowdStrike has already demonstrated willingness to stop reporting GDR.

I focus on the structural factors that make GDR decline below 95% unlikely even in pessimistic scenarios. Falcon Flex with >$1.35B ending ARR and 31-month average duration means a substantial portion of customers are on extended commitments that contractually prevent churn. Module adoption at 49% 6+ creates deep integration that makes rip-and-replace prohibitively expensive — the committee's 'compounding switching costs' assessment is well-evidenced. The CCP concluded Q4 FY2025 and GDR still held at 97%, meaning the metric wasn't artificially supported by concessions. Net new ARR of $265M (+73% YoY) in Q3 FY2026 shows the platform is not just retaining but expanding. For GDR to drop below 95%, you'd need roughly 2-3% of the customer base to churn in a single quarter — implausible given the structural lock-in unless a truly catastrophic event occurs beyond what's currently visible. The non-disclosure mechanic further reduces probability.

The resolution design strongly favors NO. CrowdStrike has already stopped disclosing GDR, and non-disclosure resolves NO by default. Even if GDR has genuinely deteriorated below 95%, the company has no obligation to resume disclosure. The 97% GDR through the July 2024 outage — the worst IT outage in history affecting 8.5M Windows systems — is the strongest evidence of structural lock-in in the dataset. Module adoption continues deepening (49% at 6+, 34% at 7+) and Falcon Flex creates multi-year contractual commitments. The DOJ/SEC investigation is a legitimate concern but has not produced enforcement action, and government customers' procurement processes move slowly. A 2pp+ decline from 97% within FY2027 requires a scenario worse than the outage — hard to construct.

The GDR disclosure cessation is the most important signal and I give it more weight than the 97% historical figure. Management stopped reporting their single strongest competitive metric without explanation, coinciding with the DOJ investigation period. This is a classic information suppression pattern. However, even if GDR has deteriorated, the resolution requires disclosure of a sub-95% figure. CrowdStrike's incentive is to simply not report it. The committee's unresolved debate about whether cessation is 'routine or concerning' has HIGH materiality, but the resolution mechanics make it moot — concerning or not, non-disclosure = NO. I assign LOW confidence because the 3+ quarters of data staleness means we're estimating with limited information, but the resolution asymmetry strongly favors NO.

Two paths to YES: (1) CrowdStrike voluntarily resumes GDR disclosure at sub-95% — extremely unlikely given they have no obligation and it would damage the narrative; (2) GDR deterioration is so severe it surfaces through other metrics (customer count declines, ARR deceleration) forcing analyst estimates — but this would require dramatic deterioration inconsistent with the expanding ARR trajectory (+73% YoY net new ARR). The expanding module adoption and Falcon Flex commitments create structural resistance to GDR decline. The committee's threshold of 94% for 2 consecutive quarters triggering reassessment is itself lower than this market's 95% threshold, suggesting the committee considered sub-95% GDR to be a tail scenario. CrowdStrike is growing too fast for retention to deteriorate this sharply absent a second catastrophic event.

97% GDR through worst IT outage ever. Non-disclosure = NO. Module adoption deepening. Falcon Flex creates multi-year lock-in. ARR reaccelerating. No enforcement action from DOJ/SEC. CrowdStrike has no incentive to disclose deteriorated GDR and has already stopped reporting it. Very low probability.

The GDR cessation is suspicious but the resolution mechanics heavily favor NO. Even if GDR has declined to 95-96%, management can simply not report it. For YES, you need both actual deterioration below 95% AND disclosure — a conjoint probability of two individually unlikely events. The structural factors (module adoption, Falcon Flex, 74K+ diversified customers) make even the deterioration itself improbable absent a second major incident.

Base rate for platform cybersecurity companies maintaining above-95% GDR is very high. CrowdStrike maintained 97% through the worst possible stress test. Falcon Flex and module deepening create increasing lock-in over time. Non-disclosure defaults to NO. DOJ/SEC risk is real but has not materialized into enforcement. Very unlikely to resolve YES.