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Will Datadog's percentage of customers using 4+ products decline below 52% in any quarter reported by H1 2026?

Resolves August 15, 2026(170d)
IG: 0.60

Current Prediction

3%
Likely No
Model Agreement99%
Predictions9 runs
Last UpdatedFebruary 10, 2026

Prediction History

Initial
6%
Feb 6
-3pp
Current
3%
Feb 10
Q4 2025 earnings

4+ adoption rose to 55% (from 54%), widening buffer to 3pp above threshold. Moat trajectory upgraded to 'Widening (confirmed)'. New 10+ product tier disclosed at 9%.

Why This Question Matters

Multi-product adoption is the operational backbone of the DEFENSIBLE moat classification. The 4+ product tier (54%, up from 49%) is the cleanest evidence of deepening switching costs and the Moat Mapper's primary evidence for a widening trajectory. A decline below 52% for two consecutive quarters would indicate the switching cost moat is eroding rather than widening, potentially downgrading DEFENSIBLE and undermining the platform lock-in thesis. Continued expansion strengthens the moat widening case.

COMPETITIVE_POSITIONREVENUE_DURABILITY

Prediction Distribution

0%25%50%75%100%
opus
sonnet
haiku
Range: 2%4%Aggregate: 3%
Individual Predictions(9 runs)
opusRun 1
3%

With Q4 2025 now reporting 55% (up from 54% in Q3), the threshold has widened to 3pp above the 52% resolution line. Only Q1 2026 and Q2 2026 remain as possible trigger quarters — down from three quarters previously. The metric has now shown five consecutive quarters of increase or stability (Q3 2024: 49%, Q1 2025: 51%, Q2 2025: 52%, Q3 2025: 54%, Q4 2025: 55%). A 3pp+ single-quarter decline has no historical precedent for Datadog's multi-product adoption metric. The moat trajectory is now confirmed as 'Widening' — not conditional. All higher tiers are accelerating (6+ at 33%, 8+ at 18%, 10+ at 9%), demonstrating deep structural adoption that anchors the 4+ metric. Record bookings of $1.63B and 18 deals over $10M TCV indicate enterprise commitment deepening. The only scenario for YES requires an unprecedented systemic shock in the next two quarters.

55% current level requires 3pp+ decline — no historical precedent for this metricOnly 2 quarters remaining (was 3) — fewer chances for anomalyMoat trajectory upgraded to 'Widening (confirmed)' removes prior conditionality
opusRun 2
4%

The update materially reduces YES probability. Previously, from 54% with 3 quarters, we needed a 2pp drop in any of three windows. Now from 55% with only 2 quarters, we need a 3pp+ drop in either window. The new logo bookings more than doubling is a genuine dilution risk — new customers start with fewer products and could lower the percentage if they represent a large enough share of the denominator. However, the cross-sell engine is also strengthening (NRR ~120%, three pillars each above $1B ARR). The calibration feedback from sibling markets suggests our ensemble was insufficiently confident when leaning in the correct direction. Both resolved siblings showed we should have been more decisive. Applying that lesson: this market is even more clearly NO than before, so I push probability lower. A small residual for truly unforeseeable events (metric restatement, massive customer base change from acquisition).

3pp buffer at 55% vs 2pp buffer at 54% — materially harder to breachCalibration feedback: ensemble was underconfident on prior DDOG markets — push harder toward NONew logo doubling creates dilution vector but insufficient magnitude to breach 52%
opusRun 3
3%

Let me consider the most plausible path to YES: massive new customer onboarding diluting the 4+ percentage. New logo bookings more than doubled, and new customers contributed 25% of revenue growth in Q3. If this acceleration continues and new logos represent a disproportionate share of the customer count increase, the denominator grows with customers mostly in the 1-3 product range. But even in this scenario, the numerator (existing 4+ customers) is extremely sticky with mid-to-high 90s retention, and the cross-sell pipeline converts new customers upward. For the percentage to drop 3pp, you'd need the customer base to expand ~15-20% in a quarter with zero cross-selling — completely inconsistent with the $1.63B bookings and deepening adoption data. The disclosure of the 10+ product tier at 9% is a powerful new data point: these deeply embedded customers create structural ballast. Probability is near-floor.

Even aggressive new logo dilution math cannot produce 3pp decline given retention dynamics10+ product tier at 9% — deeply embedded customers create structural ballast for the 4+ metricRecord $1.63B bookings reflects both new and expanding customer activity
sonnetRun 1
2%

This is approaching certainty NO territory. The metric went UP to 55% in Q4 — the exact quarter that was the 'conditional' test for moat widening. It passed. Now you'd need a 3pp decline in Q1 or Q2 2026. The trajectory since Q3 2024: 49% -> 51% -> 52% -> 54% -> 55%. That's a monotonically increasing series with no dips. All higher tiers also increasing. Three product pillars each exceeded $1B ARR. The company just disclosed a 10+ product tier. There is no mechanism by which this drops 3pp in a quarter absent a company-destroying event, and even then, retention dynamics would buffer the metric for multiple quarters before showing in the percentage.

Monotonically increasing series over 5 data points — no historical dip ever recorded3pp decline in one quarter is structurally near-impossible with mid-to-high 90s retentionAll structural indicators (tiers, bookings, ARR pillars) point to continued increase
sonnetRun 2
3%

Applying calibration lesson from sibling markets: we were right directionally but not confident enough. Both resolved DDOG markets showed the ensemble should have pushed harder. For this market, the case is even stronger for NO now: buffer increased from 2pp to 3pp, exposure window narrowed from 3 to 2 quarters, and the moat is confirmed widening. The only non-trivial risk I can identify is a metric methodology change — if DDOG redefines how products are counted or changes the customer base denominator for some reason. But companies virtually never retroactively change favorable metrics mid-trend. Assigning 3% to account for extreme tail risks including things I cannot foresee.

Calibration feedback demands higher confidence when direction is clearBuffer widened and exposure window narrowed vs prior prediction — strictly easier for NOMetric methodology change is only non-negligible risk but extremely unlikely
sonnetRun 3
3%

The new customer doubling deserves careful consideration. If DDOG's customer count surges (from aggressive sales expansion), and these new customers overwhelmingly use 1-3 products, the denominator effect could theoretically compress the 4+ percentage. But let's quantify: DDOG had ~28,800 customers with >$100K ARR at end of Q4. Even if they added 3,000+ such customers in a quarter (wildly above trend), and ALL started with <4 products, and ZERO existing customers crossed the 4+ threshold, the percentage would barely move 1-2pp. The math simply doesn't allow a 3pp drop with realistic customer dynamics. And the cross-sell engine works fast — customers move to 4+ rapidly as evidenced by the consistently increasing trend.

Quantitative analysis of customer base dynamics shows 3pp drop is mathematically implausibleCross-sell velocity means new customers quickly move into 4+ territory28,800+ customer base provides massive denominator stability
haikuRun 1
3%

Q4 2025 data confirmed the upward trend: 55%, up from 54%. Now 3pp above the 52% threshold with only 2 quarters remaining. The trend has been monotonically increasing for 5 straight data points. All higher adoption tiers accelerating. Record bookings. Moat confirmed widening. This is a near-certain NO. The required 3pp single-quarter decline has no precedent and no plausible mechanism.

55% with 3pp buffer, only 2 quarters of exposure remainingFive consecutive increases with no historical declinesNo plausible mechanism for 3pp single-quarter drop
haikuRun 2
4%

The update is strongly confirmatory for NO. Key considerations: (1) Buffer increased from 2pp to 3pp. (2) Exposure reduced from 3 quarters to 2. (3) Moat trajectory upgraded from conditional to confirmed. (4) New 10+ product tier disclosed — deeper adoption than previously visible. The new logo doubling is the only factor that could conceivably work against the metric, but cross-sell dynamics and retention overwhelm any dilution effect. Sibling market calibration says we should be more decisive when the evidence is clear.

All three changes (higher level, fewer quarters, confirmed moat) favor lower probabilityNew 10+ tier reveals deeper adoption structure than previously knownSibling market calibration: be more confident when evidence is clear
haikuRun 3
3%

The most important update fact: Q4 2025 showed continued increase to 55%. This was the quarter the moat assessment was conditional on — it confirmed widening. With the metric now 3pp above threshold and only two quarters of exposure, the probability is roughly half of the prior assessment (which was 6% median with 2pp buffer and 3 quarters). Adjusting for the stronger evidence base and calibration feedback suggesting more decisiveness, I place this at 3%.

Roughly half the prior risk: larger buffer, fewer quarters, stronger evidenceQ4 confirmation removes the key conditionality from prior assessmentCalibration feedback supports more confident positioning

Resolution Criteria

Resolves YES if Datadog reports that the percentage of customers using 4 or more products falls below 52% in any quarter reported through H1 2026 (Q4 2025 through Q2 2026 earnings). Uses the metric as disclosed by management in earnings calls or press releases ('percentage of customers using 4 or more products'). Resolves NO if the metric remains at 52% or above in all reported quarters.

Resolution Source

Datadog quarterly earnings press releases and supplemental data tables for Q4 2025, Q1 2026, and Q2 2026

Source Trigger

Multi-product 4+ adoption drops below 52% for 2 consecutive quarters

moat-mapperCOMPETITIVE_POSITIONHIGH
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