Will Credit Karma maintain above 15% revenue growth in Q3 FY2026?
Current Prediction
Why This Question Matters
Credit Karma's H2 lapping risk is the most explicitly flagged deceleration driver by management. Q2 delivered 23% growth but full-year guidance of 10-13% implies a sharp H2 slowdown. Whether Credit Karma sustains above 15% or drops toward the guided range tests the durability of the consumer platform flywheel and whether the prior deceleration (34% to 15%) was a floor or merely a pause before further contraction.
Prediction Distribution
Individual Predictions(9 runs)
The guidance math is the key constraint: full-year CK at 10-13% midpoint (11.5%) with H1 at ~19% requires H2 to average ~3-5%. If H2 averages 4%, Q3 and Q4 must split near that average. Q3 has a structural tax season advantage over Q4 (refund-motivated credit building, tax intent routing, refund assistant monetization). This tax season tailwind may allow Q3 to deliver 10-15% while Q4 delivers near 0% or negative, averaging to ~5-7% H2. The 15% threshold sits exactly at the upper end of what the guidance math allows for Q3 to still leave room for a Q4 deceleration. I'd assess ~40% probability that Q3 lands above 15%.
The lapping argument is powerful and specific. CFO named credit cards and personal loans as the products seeing the hard H2 comp. In Q3 FY2025, personal loans and credit cards were presumably growing strongly (the period being lapped). If these contributed ~20+ combined points to Q3 FY2025 CK growth, and they now contribute near 0 or negative points to Q3 FY2026, CK growth falls by 20 points from whatever level it was. If Q3 FY2025 CK was 25%, and the loan/card contribution falls from 20pts to 5pts, Q3 FY2026 CK is approximately 25% - 15pts = 10%. Auto insurance at 4pts and base growth hold. This math puts Q3 CK around 8-12%, below the 15% threshold. 38% YES probability.
The critical unknown is the distribution of lapping within H2. If Q3 FY2025 was stronger than Q4 FY2025 for credit cards/personal loans, Q3 FY2026 faces the harder comp (lower probability of beating 15%). If Q4 FY2025 was stronger (holiday season credit card spend), Q3 FY2026 faces the easier comp within H2 (higher probability of beating 15%). Without knowing the Q3 FY2025 vs Q4 FY2025 split, there's genuine uncertainty about which half of H2 faces the harder comp. The tax season tailwind is a Q3-specific factor that doesn't apply to Q4 — this asymmetry argues for Q3 being the better H2 quarter. On balance, 42% YES probability reflecting uncertainty but slight lean toward below 15%.
The prior 19-point deceleration episode (34%→15%) is the most informative base rate. That deceleration occurred over multiple quarters in a similar lapping environment. The current setup: 23% in Q2 → management-implied 3-5% in H2. If the deceleration hits Q3 fully (rather than being spread over Q3 and Q4), Q3 CK could land at 5-10%. If it's spread equally, Q3 is at 3-5%. If Q3 benefits from tax season asymmetry and the hard comp is more Q4-weighted, Q3 could be 10-18%. The range of plausible outcomes spans from 0-25%. The 15% threshold divides this range approximately 40-60, suggesting 40% YES probability.
The 10-13% full-year CK guide already embeds management's view of H2 headwinds. Management typically guides with conservative assumptions but doesn't usually guide below what they're confident delivering. If the guide midpoint is 11.5% for the full year and H1 is ~19%, management expects H2 to be materially worse — probably in the 3-5% range. For Q3 to land above 15%, either (a) Q3 is the one good H2 quarter and Q4 is near zero, or (b) the guidance is significantly conservative on H2. Neither is base case. The 38% YES probability reflects the tax season optionality but acknowledges management's signal that H2 is structurally challenged.
Auto insurance is the wildcard that most models underweight. It contributed 4pts to Q2 CK growth and doesn't face the same lapping headwind as credit cards and personal loans (auto insurance growth was less extreme in H2 FY2025). If auto insurance contributes another 4pts in Q3, and base CK growth is 8-12%, auto insurance alone could push Q3 CK to 12-16%. The 15% threshold sits in the auto-insurance-upside zone — if auto insurance continues and credit/loan comps are 'merely' hard rather than devastating, Q3 CK lands at 15-18%. This path is plausible and argues for 40-42% YES.
CK: 23% in Q2, lapping headwinds in H2, full-year guide implies ~3-5% H2. Tax season gives Q3 a structural edge within H2. Prior deceleration was 19 points (34%→15%). 15% threshold is the floor of what Q3 could reasonably achieve with strong tax season execution. 42% YES probability.
Management explicitly said H2 lapping is a challenge. Full-year 10-13% guide with H1 ~19% requires H2 at ~3-5%. At 3-5% H2 average, Q3 above 15% requires Q4 to be significantly negative (below 0%). This is possible but requires Q4 to be materially bad for credit markets. More likely: Q3 is 5-10%, Q4 is 0-5%, averaging 5-7% H2. This math puts 39% YES probability on Q3 landing above 15%.
The market was assigned consensusFragile = true in the original analysis — this is correct. The outcome genuinely could go either way around the 15% threshold. The prior CK volatility (34% → 15% over 4 quarters) shows that large decelerations are within the historical range. The current setup: 23% → somewhere in the 5-20% range in Q3 depending on comp timing and tax season execution. 15% is a plausible but not base-case outcome. 40% YES probability reflects genuine uncertainty.
Resolution Criteria
Resolves YES if Intuit's Q3 FY2026 earnings report discloses Credit Karma revenue growth exceeding 15.0% year-over-year. Resolves NO if Credit Karma growth is 15.0% or below, or if Intuit does not provide Credit Karma-specific growth rates (in which case, implied growth from segment disclosures may be used). Uses the growth rate as stated in the earnings press release or supplemental disclosures.
Resolution Source
Intuit Q3 FY2026 earnings press release, call transcript, or supplemental financial data
Source Trigger
Credit Karma H2 lapping risk -- management cautions about lapping strong credit card and personal loan growth
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