Will KRMN's G&A as a percentage of revenue remain above 15% in Q4 FY2025?

The Q4 revenue of $134.5M is higher than the $120-130M estimated in the prior context, which helps the denominator. However, the EPS miss despite an EBITDA beat strongly suggests cost pressures in SG&A or below-the-line items. With 5 acquisitions now completed (Seemann/MSC adding ~$225M in deal value), G&A burden should be elevated from integration costs, additional corporate infrastructure, and incremental SBC. At $134.5M revenue, the threshold is G&A above $20.2M. Given Q3 was $20M with only 3 integrations, Q4 with 5 integrations likely keeps G&A in the $20-22M range. Probability stays similar to prior estimate.

The higher revenue base ($134.5M vs prior estimates of $125-130M) mechanically reduces the ratio. At Q3's G&A of $20M, the Q4 ratio would be 14.9% — just below the 15% threshold. This makes the outcome more borderline than previously assessed. However, the Seemann/MSC acquisition adds G&A costs not present in Q3, likely pushing G&A to $21-22M, which at $134.5M revenue yields 15.6-16.4%. The EPS miss supports the view that costs are running ahead. Slightly lower probability than prior 0.70 due to the higher revenue base creating a tighter margin.

The core thesis remains: 5 simultaneous integrations, public company cost ramp, and SBC will keep G&A elevated. The EPS miss provides new evidence that costs are not moderating as fast as management's operating leverage narrative implies. While the higher revenue base ($134.5M) helps, the addition of Seemann/MSC G&A (~$1-2M incremental per quarter) should push total G&A to $21-22M, yielding 15.6-16.4%. I maintain the prior 0.70 estimate — the higher revenue and higher G&A roughly offset.

Q4 revenue of $134.5M is higher than expected, which helps the ratio denominator. At Q3 G&A levels ($20M), the ratio would be 14.9% — just below threshold, resolving NO. But the question is whether G&A increased from Q3 levels due to Seemann/MSC integration costs. With 5 acquisitions now in progress and an EPS miss suggesting cost overrun, G&A likely rose to $20.5-22M range. At $21M, ratio = 15.6% (YES). The outcome hinges on whether Seemann/MSC added meaningful G&A in Q4 — which they almost certainly did, given the deal size ($225M). Probability slightly below prior 0.70.

The EPS miss is the most informative new data point. Despite a revenue beat ($134.5M) and adjusted EBITDA beat, EPS missed — indicating costs below the EBITDA line are running higher than expected. G&A is a major component of this. With five acquisitions adding integration overhead, corporate G&A should have increased from Q3's $20M. Even a modest increase to $20.5M at $134.5M revenue yields 15.2% (YES). The probability of staying above 15% is slightly higher than the prior estimate given the EPS miss signal.

The higher revenue ($134.5M) makes the arithmetic tighter. If G&A is flat at $20M from Q3, the ratio is 14.9% — a whisker below 15%, resolving NO. But the Seemann/MSC acquisition closed during FY2025 and should add incremental G&A. The question becomes how much: even $300K incremental pushes G&A above $20.2M and the ratio above 15%. Given the acquisition size and integration complexity, $1-2M incremental G&A is reasonable, making YES the likely outcome. But the borderline math introduces more uncertainty than the prior assessment, hence a slightly lower probability.

Revenue at $134.5M is higher than expected, making the ratio more borderline. But 5 acquisitions and EPS miss suggest G&A likely above $20M. At $21M G&A, ratio = 15.6% (YES). The earnings data keeps probability similar to prior estimate with slight downward adjustment for the higher revenue base.

The fundamental drivers have not changed — public company costs, SBC, and integration overhead from 5 acquisitions should keep G&A above 15% of revenue. The EPS miss corroborates elevated costs. Higher revenue helps the denominator but is offset by incremental G&A from Seemann/MSC. Maintaining prior probability.

The $134.5M revenue base makes the math tighter than the prior assessment assumed. At flat Q3 G&A levels, the ratio would be 14.9% — barely NO. The incremental G&A from Seemann/MSC is the swing factor. Most likely G&A rose modestly, keeping the ratio above 15%, but there is more uncertainty now. Slightly lower probability.