Will any Okta named executive officer make an open-market stock purchase by July 2026?

The base rate for SaaS executive open-market purchases is extremely low — insiders receive substantial equity through RSU grants and rarely supplement with discretionary purchases. All 5 Okta NEOs maintain active 10b5-1 selling plans that dispose of all or nearly all net RSU vestings, and there have been zero open-market purchases across all 9 insiders in 20 Form 4 filings over 4+ months. The CEO's plan sells 100% of new compensation. For a purchase to occur, an NEO would need to either pause their 10b5-1 plan or make a supplemental discretionary purchase — both require a strong conviction catalyst. At ~$88/share with ~26x non-GAAP P/E, the stock does not present a distressed bargain that typically motivates insider purchases. The 5-month observation window is relatively short.

The analysis facts paint a picture of systematic insider selling, not buying. Every NEO has a 10b5-1 plan disposing of all or nearly all net vestings — this is a deliberate, voluntary choice. The say/do disconnect is stark: management describes a generational AI opportunity while reducing their personal economic exposure. For an open-market purchase to occur in the next 5 months, something would need to fundamentally shift: either a significant stock price decline creating a perceived bargain, a major positive catalyst like a transformative deal, or a board directive to improve optics. None of these are visible in the current analysis. The minority MISALIGNED position in the committee debate actually reinforces the NO case — if insiders genuinely do not expect material appreciation, they have no incentive to purchase. The $1B buyback authorization provides corporate cover without requiring personal capital commitment.

I assign slightly higher probability than pure base rate because of two tail scenarios. First, the improving board governance (4 new directors, dual-class unwinding) could theoretically prompt a new board member or NEO to make a symbolic purchase to signal commitment — new directors sometimes do this within their first year. Second, if Okta's stock declines materially (e.g., 20%+ drop on earnings miss), the perceived bargain could motivate a discretionary purchase, especially given the board just authorized a $1B buyback signaling the company considers shares undervalued. However, the 4+ months of pure selling with zero purchases is a very strong prior. The committee's MIXED classification captures this tension — structural governance improvements exist but economic behavior is uniformly bearish. The unresolved MIXED vs. MISALIGNED debate does not affect the probability of a purchase occurring; it affects interpretation if one does occur.

This is straightforward. Zero purchases across all insiders over 4+ months, all NEOs selling everything through 10b5-1 plans, and SaaS insider purchases are already rare events. The question specifically requires a named executive officer — not just any insider — which further narrows the pool. At $88/share, a meaningful signal purchase would cost $100K+, and these executives are already reducing exposure. The 5-month window provides limited opportunity for a fundamental change in behavior. There is no catalyst in the analysis facts that would trigger a purchase.

The data is unambiguous: 20 Form 4 filings, zero purchases, universal 10b5-1 selling. The question asks about NEOs specifically — CEO, CFO, COO, CLO, CAO — all five of whom are on record selling. The CFO retains 144,385 vested shares (~$13M) which shows some level of ongoing exposure, but retention of existing holdings is very different from making a new discretionary purchase. The buyback-while-selling pattern actually makes a purchase less likely, not more — the company has provided a corporate mechanism to support the stock, removing any pressure on individuals to do so. I give a small non-zero probability for an unexpected event like a new NEO appointment who makes an initial commitment purchase, or a dramatic stock decline triggering a confidence purchase.

The question requires transaction code 'P' on Form 4 by a named executive officer — a very specific, discretionary action. The analysis establishes that all current NEOs have chosen the opposite behavior: selling via 10b5-1. For a purchase to happen, an executive would need to step outside their established selling program and deploy personal capital. At ~26x non-GAAP P/E, Okta is not priced at distress levels that historically trigger insider purchases. The 25% SBC as percentage of revenue means these executives receive generous equity compensation, further reducing any motivation to buy on the open market. The committee's cross-lens finding that both Fugazi Filter and Insider Investigator independently arrived at MIXED governance alignment through different evidence paths reinforces the systematic nature of this selling behavior.

Zero purchases in 4+ months across all insiders. All NEOs selling via 10b5-1 plans. SaaS insider purchases are rare. No bargain catalyst at $88/share. Very likely resolves NO.

Base rate for SaaS exec open-market purchases is very low. Current behavior is uniformly selling. 5-month window is short. Only scenario for YES is a dramatic stock decline or new NEO making symbolic purchase. Assigning low single-digit probability.

20 Form 4 filings with zero purchases is the key fact. CEO sells 100% of vestings. No insider is accumulating. $1B buyback replaces need for individual purchases. Resolution requires specific Form 4 code 'P' — very unlikely given current trajectory.