Back to Forecasting
ORCLActive

Will Moody's or S&P downgrade Oracle's credit rating below investment grade by December 2026?

Resolves December 31, 2026(308d)
IG: 0.60

Current Prediction

9%
Likely No
Model Agreement95%
Predictions9 runs
Last UpdatedFebruary 9, 2026

Why This Question Matters

Oracle's Baa2/BBB ratings are one notch above speculative grade with CDS at crisis-era levels. A downgrade below investment grade would constrain financing capacity for the $50B annual CapEx buildout, potentially trigger covenant issues, and shift FUNDING_FRAGILITY from STRAINED to CRITICAL. This is the highest-impact single-event trigger identified by 4 lenses, testing whether credit markets validate or repudiate the current balance sheet trajectory.

FUNDING_FRAGILITYCAPITAL_DEPLOYMENTEXPECTATIONS_PRICED

Prediction Distribution

0%25%50%75%100%
opus
sonnet
haiku
Range: 6%14%Aggregate: 9%
Individual Predictions(9 runs)
opusRun 1
8%

Oracle requires a TWO-notch downgrade to fall below investment grade (from Baa2/BBB to below Baa3/BBB-). Multi-notch downgrades of large investment-grade issuers in a single action are extremely rare -- typically requiring acute liquidity crisis or fraud discovery. Rating agencies follow a sequential process: negative outlook -> one-notch downgrade -> further review. With no negative outlook currently in place, reaching junk by December 2026 would require an unusually accelerated timeline. Management has explicitly committed to maintaining IG status and demonstrated willingness to access capital markets ($25B bond offering). However, CDS >125bps at crisis-era levels and FCF collapsing from +$10.8B to projected -$30B signal genuine deterioration that could initiate the process.

Two-notch drop required -- multi-notch downgrades are rare for large IG issuersNo negative outlook currently in place -- sequential process not yet startedManagement commitment to IG plus $25B bond offering shows defensive capacity
opusRun 2
11%

The base rate for IG-to-junk transitions within a single calendar year is historically very low (<2% for Baa-rated issuers), but Oracle's situation has several features that elevate this above base rate. The $248B lease commitment treatment by rating agencies is a key uncertainty -- if agencies move toward treating these as debt-equivalent, leverage ratios deteriorate dramatically and could trigger an accelerated review. The cash runway of ~14 months (through April 2027) and annual mandatory outflows approaching $70B against $67B revenue create a structural vulnerability. However, the retained capital market access and management's defensive options (CapEx reduction, asset sales) are significant mitigants that would likely be deployed before a junk downgrade.

Base rate for Baa-to-junk in one year is <2% but Oracle exceeds typical risk factorsLease obligation treatment uncertainty could trigger reassessmentCash runway only ~14 months but management has defensive levers
opusRun 3
7%

The resolution criteria is specifically below investment grade -- not merely a downgrade within IG. This requires breaching Baa3/BBB-, which is two notches below current Baa2/BBB. The mechanical process alone creates a high bar: rating agencies would first need to place Oracle on negative outlook, then execute a first downgrade (to Baa3/BBB-), then execute a second downgrade (to Ba1/BB+), all within ~10 months from now. The fastest path would be a multi-notch action triggered by a credit event, but Oracle's situation -- while strained -- is not acute. Revenue is still growing 13%, OCI is growing 66%, and the company just successfully raised $25B. The insider selling pattern and accounting questions from the Fugazi Filter add modest upward pressure, but not enough to overcome the procedural and structural barriers.

Two-notch mechanical barrier requires extraordinary circumstances or multi-step processRevenue growing 13% and OCI 66% -- not the profile of imminent junk$25B successful bond raise demonstrates market confidence above junk threshold
sonnetRun 1
12%

Oracle's credit metrics are deteriorating rapidly -- FCF from +$10.8B to -$30B in two years, mandatory outflows approaching revenue, CDS at crisis levels. The D.A. Davidson 'barely hanging on' quote and four-lens convergence on credit risk as a critical trigger elevate concern. However, the question requires below investment grade entirely, not just a one-notch downgrade. No negative outlook is currently in place, and rating agencies rarely execute multi-notch downgrades without a precipitating event (fraud, liquidity crisis, covenant breach). The ~10 month timeline is tight for the full sequence. I weight the OpenAI concentration risk as a plausible catalyst that could accelerate the timeline.

FCF collapse from +$10.8B to -$30B signals severe deteriorationNo negative outlook in place -- process not startedOpenAI concentration risk could be a catalyst for accelerated action
sonnetRun 2
9%

The structural analysis is clear: Oracle needs to drop two notches to resolve YES, rating agencies haven't even started the negative outlook process, and management has both commitment and demonstrated capability to defend IG status. The $25B bond offering is the strongest single data point -- it proves market willingness to lend at IG terms, which agencies heavily weight. The deterioration is real (FCF collapse, $70B mandatory outflows vs $67B revenue), but the question is whether it deteriorates fast enough to trigger TWO downgrades in 10 months. Historical data on Baa-rated large-cap tech companies transitioning to junk within a year is essentially zero absent fraud or acute crisis.

$25B bond offering proves market still lends at IG termsZero historical precedent for large-cap tech Baa-to-junk in under 1 year without fraudDeterioration is real but timeline is prohibitively short for two-notch drop
sonnetRun 3
14%

I'm weighting the tail risk scenarios more heavily. The prediction context identifies multiple plausible catalysts that could accelerate the timeline: OpenAI contract modification, additional financing partner withdrawal (Blue Owl was an early signal), CapEx guidance raise beyond $50B, and the $248B lease obligation reclassification risk. If two or more catalysts materialize simultaneously, rating agencies could act faster than historical norms. The Q2 FY26 anomalously low OCF of $2.1B, if it represents a new trend rather than a one-quarter anomaly, would rapidly erode interest coverage from the already-thin 4-5x level. The ACCOUNTING_INTEGRITY = CONCERNING signal from Fugazi Filter adds the possibility of undisclosed deterioration. However, even with elevated tail risk weighting, the mechanical barrier of two notches in 10 months keeps probability below 15%.

Multiple plausible catalysts could compound simultaneouslyAnomalously low Q2 OCF ($2.1B) may signal accelerating cash flow deteriorationAccounting integrity concerns could mask true financial position
haikuRun 1
10%

Oracle needs two downgrades to reach junk status. No negative outlook is in place. Rating agencies are slow-moving. Management committed to maintaining IG and raised $25B in bonds. However, CDS at crisis levels and FCF collapse signal genuine stress. The 10-month window is very tight for a two-step downgrade process. Probability is low but non-trivial given the severity of financial deterioration.

Two-notch barrier with no negative outlook in place10-month timeline very tight for multi-step rating processCDS crisis levels signal real but not imminent downgrade risk
haikuRun 2
6%

The base rate for Baa-rated companies falling to junk within one year is approximately 1-2%. Oracle's elevated risk factors (CDS, FCF collapse, leverage) may double or triple this, but the structural barriers remain strong: two notches required, no negative outlook started, $25B bond offering proves market access, and management has defensive options. Revenue is still growing. The most likely scenario is a negative outlook placement or at most a one-notch downgrade, not a fall to junk.

Base rate 1-2% for Baa-to-junk in one yearRevenue still growing 13% -- not a junk profileManagement defensive options prevent worst case
haikuRun 3
9%

The financial trajectory is concerning -- $70B outflows vs $67B revenue, FCF collapse, CDS at 2009 levels. But the question is specifically about falling BELOW investment grade, not just a downgrade. The two-notch requirement and typical rating agency process (outlook change first, then one notch, then review) makes this very unlikely in 10 months. Oracle's continued capital market access is the key differentiator from companies that do get downgraded to junk quickly.

Two-notch requirement is the critical mechanical barrierCapital market access differentiates from typical junk-bound companiesFinancial trajectory concerning but timeline too short

Resolution Criteria

Resolves YES if either Moody's Investors Service downgrades Oracle Corporation's senior unsecured debt rating below Baa3, or S&P Global Ratings downgrades Oracle Corporation's long-term issuer credit rating below BBB-, at any point before December 31, 2026. Resolves NO if both Moody's and S&P maintain Oracle at investment grade (Baa3/BBB- or above) through December 31, 2026. Negative outlook placement alone does not resolve YES -- an actual rating change below investment grade is required.

Resolution Source

Moody's Investors Service and S&P Global Ratings official rating action announcements

Source Trigger

Credit rating downgrade or negative outlook placement by Moody's or S&P -- would move assessment toward CRITICAL

stress-scannerFUNDING_FRAGILITYHIGH
View ORCL Analysis

Full multi-lens equity analysis