Will any Oracle insider make an open-market stock purchase by June 30, 2026?

The base rate for insider purchases when the recent pattern is universal selling is very low. Seven insiders all sold with zero purchases during a 30-40% decline -- a strong revealed-preference signal. The class action (Barrows v. Oracle, lead plaintiff deadline April 6, 2026) creates legal constraints likely spanning the entire resolution window. Trading window restrictions around Q3 earnings (March 2026) and Q4 earnings (June 2026) further reduce available buying windows to perhaps 6-8 weeks. Even during confirmed open windows (October, December-January), nobody bought. The behavioral inertia is very strong.

Oracle likely has 10-15 Section 16 insiders, but the coordinated selling pattern suggests shared information or sentiment rather than independent decisions. The class action is the decisive constraint: legal counsel typically advises against all discretionary trading during active securities litigation. With lead plaintiff deadline April 6 and likely motion-to-dismiss proceedings through June, the legal overhang spans the entire resolution window. Kehring's 51% position reduction and Magouyrk's 26% reduction represent clear votes with their feet. The 73% discretionary nature of selling means these were active decisions, not pre-programmed plans.

Counter-arguments considered: RSU grants partially offset sales reducing motivation to buy; Ellison's $40B+ stake provides structural alignment; new executives or directors could join and purchase; dramatic price movement could trigger opportunistic buying. However, the class action is decisive -- securities litigation typically leads companies to adopt enhanced trading restrictions. The 4.5-month resolution window overlaps with two earnings blackout periods (~6 weeks each), leaving perhaps 8-10 weeks of potential trading. The combination of demonstrated selling preference, legal overhang, and restricted windows makes a purchase unlikely but not negligible.

The most relevant fact is that insiders had confirmed open trading windows (October sales prove windows were open) and chose to sell rather than buy during a 30-40% decline. If insiders wouldn't buy at $192, what price would trigger a purchase? The class action adds a new constraint not present during the earlier period. However, the resolution window is nearly 5 months covering significant ground. Board turnover or new appointments could trigger action. For 10-15 insiders over ~5 months, the base rate for at least one purchase absent strong negative signals would be 15-20%, but the class action, demonstrated selling preference, and behavioral inertia reduce this significantly.

The class action is the most overlooked and decisive constraint. Once under active securities fraud litigation, insider purchases can be interpreted as attempts to artificially inflate stock price, creating additional legal exposure. Legal counsel will almost certainly advise against discretionary trading. This constraint likely covers the entire resolution window (Feb-June 2026). Even without the class action, 7 insiders all selling with zero purchases represents an extremely strong behavioral signal. Tax consequences of selling then buying back (wash sale rules, optics of buying at similar prices after recent sales) create additional friction.

Base rate approach: the context does not provide historical base rates for insider purchases following universal selling, and the committee noted the 'historical baseline unknown' for Oracle specifically. Constructing from analysis facts: with 7 sellers and 0 buyers over 4 months, extending another 4.5 months, the conditional probability given the established selling pattern is low. The key swing factor is whether a NEW insider (board appointment, new executive) might make an initial purchase. Oracle is a large company and board turnover happens, but the class action makes any new appointment unlikely to buy immediately.

Universal selling pattern with zero purchases during confirmed open windows is the dominant signal. Class action restricts trading through the resolution window. Two earnings blackout periods reduce available buying days. Even across 10-15 insiders over 4.5 months, the combination of active selling preference and legal constraints makes a purchase very unlikely.

The 'any insider' criterion broadens the probability surface, but the class action essentially freezes voluntary trading for the duration. Insiders who sold 51-52% of their positions are not candidates for buying back. The only plausible YES scenario is a new board member making a symbolic purchase, but even this is unlikely during active litigation. The 73% discretionary selling rate shows these were active bearish decisions.

Key factors: zero purchases during 30-40% decline with open windows, class action creating legal overhang through entire resolution window, 73% discretionary selling showing active bearish decisions, two earnings blackout periods limiting available windows. Small chance exists from new insider appointments or dramatic stock movement, but overall very unlikely.